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A B S T R A C T
Distributed Ledger Technology (DLT), such as blockchain, has the potential to transform supply chains. It can
provide a cryptographically secure and immutable record of transactions and associated metadata (origin,
contracts, process steps, environmental variations, microbial records, etc.) linked across whole supply chains.
The ability to trace food items within and along a supply chain is legally required by all actors within the chain.
It is critical to food safety, underpins trust and global food trade. However, current food traceability systems are
not linked between all actors within the supply chain. Key metadata on the age and process history of a food is
rarely transferred when a product is bought and sold through multiple steps within the chain. Herein, we ex-
amine the potential of massively scalable DLT to securely link the entire food supply chain, from producer to end
user. Under such a paradigm, should a food safety or quality issue ever arise, authorized end users could in-
stantly and accurately trace the origin and history of any particular food item. This novel and unparalleled
technology could help underpin trust for the safety of all food, a critical component of global food security. In
this paper, we investigate the (i) data requirements to develop DLT technology across whole supply chains, (ii)
key challenges and barriers to optimizing the complete system, and (iii) potential impacts on production effi-
ciency, legal compliance, access to global food markets and the safety of food. Our conclusion is that while DLT
has the potential to transform food systems, this can only be fully realized through the global development and
agreement on suitable data standards and governance. In addition, key technical issues need to be resolved
including challenges with DLT scalability, privacy and data architectures.
1. Background
Providing consumers with safe food of the nature and substance
both intended and expected, is a key and legally defined requirement
for all food businesses. All food businesses manage safety by deploying
traceability systems (see recent reviews of Elliott, 2014; Badia-Melis
et al., 2015; Olsen and Borit, 2018). Despite these systems, food fraud,
adulteration/contamination and food poisoning still have significant
societal impacts (see e.g. Manning and Soon, 2014). The immense scale,
speed and complexity of global food supply chains now create sig-
nificant opportunities for the production and rapid distribution of
adulterated or unsafe food (Ercsey-Ravasz et al., 2012). Food
contamination is the root cause of approximately 420,000 deaths each
year (World Health Organization, 2015), food fraud and adulteration
costs are difficult to estimate but could be> $40bn (PWC, 2016). The
economic impacts of supply chain failures are significant, for example,
Moyer et al. (2017) considered that the cost of the EU 2013 horse meat
adulteration issue (see O'mahony, 2013) was “incalculable”. Globally,
the need to reduce food borne disease is recognised in the UN Sus-
tainable Development Goals (Goal 2. End hunger, achieve food se-
curity) and the World Health Organisation (World Health Organization,
2015) states that: “achieving food security and ensuring healthy lives,
will depend in part on successful reduction of the burden of foodborne
diseases”.
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2. The importance of traceability in food safety
Effective traceability systems that minimize risk are recognised as a
critical tool to assure food safety (Aung and Chang, 2014). International
food traceability standards are set through the joint FAO and WHO
Food Standards Programme – the Codex Alimentarius Commission. The
principles of food traceability are laid out in CAC/GL 60–2006: “The
traceability/product tracing tool should be able to identify at any spe-
cified stage of the food chain (from production to distribution) from
where the food came (one step back) and to where the food went (one
step forward), as appropriate to the objectives of the food inspection
and certification system” (CAC, 2006). The adoption of these principles
is underpinned by national and international regulation (see e.g. EU
Regulation (EC) No 178/2002, and national approaches reviewed by
Charlebois et al., 2014). This pragmatic one up/one down arrangement
connects all bound supply chain members as all actors know who their
suppliers are and where their product is sold. However, reliance on the
one up/one down approach still leaves the supply chain vulnerable, as
many food products have complex multi-step vertical and horizontal
branching supply chains (e.g. multiple ingredient products). In addi-
tion, one up/one down traceability can be easily lost in commodity
products that are blended (e.g. milk from multiple farms in a dairy) or
dissected and mixed through the supply chain (e.g. animals for meat
production). With such complexity, it soon becomes impossible to
verify the provenance and quality standards of specific products. In
addition, the food industry is still largely reliant on paper records, with
limited amounts of these ever being captured into a computerized and
searchable format. Poor transparency through multiple supply chain
steps can promote or conceal fraud.
3. Distributed Ledger Technology and blockchain
Distributed Ledger Technologies (DLT, Walport, 2015; Maull et al.,
2017), such as the various implementations that also comprise Block-
chain, where data resides on ledgers (a log of transactions) but cryp-
tographically connected in chains of blocks, is proposed as an addi-
tional solution to the above challenges, allowing regulators, consumers
and businesses potentially to instantly access the whole supply chain of
any food and drink.
Ledgers are replicated (distributed), with identical copies held by all
system users. New data is only added to a ledger by consensus, when all
users agree the data is accurate. Any attempt to alter data by a single
user will be transparent to all users, in theory, creating immutability.
Early prototype systems are starting to emerge for dedicated applica-
tion within the food supply chain (e.g. Tian, 2016, 2017; IBM Food
Trust, 2018, Mao et al., 2018). In addition, twelve of the biggest global
food companies have been adopting the use of blockchain to support
how industry tracks food in the world; examples of these companies are
Walmart, Nestle, Unilever, Tyson Food, Driscoll's, and Dole Food
(Forbes, 2018).
Fig. 1 illustrates the application across a whole food supply chain
from farm through to cooking by the consumer. Each member of the
chain (farmers, food manufacturers, hauliers, retailers and consumers)
may have access to a full copy of the ledger, data is sent to the ledger by
all supply chain actors, but is only accessible to others by permission.
The data is gathered in coherent “blocks” that are connected together
with immutable encrypted keys. With permission any actor in the chain
can see the complete provenance of a food item as it moves up and
down the supply chain, as well associated metadata (temperatures etc).
In addition, regulators would have a “read only” access to the ledgers
giving them instant access to the complete provenance of any particular
food item, across multiple international actors. The data connectivity,
speed of access and its immutability provides, in theory, a step change
in food traceability, even enabling regulators to instantly unravel multi
component products (e.g. in Fig. 1 where animal protein is mixed with
grain based products).
Technically, blockchain is a distributed database that records peer-
to-peer electronic transactions permanently, so that transactions can
only be accessed, inspected and updated. Blockchain uses crypto-
graphically secure keys to link all transactional elements of a supply
chain, putting trust directly in the network and avoiding the need of
central trust institutions. The trust in a blockchain is applied to data,
services, processes, identities, business logic, or any digitalised asset.
More specifically, a blockchain is a place in which data can be linearly
stored semipublicly in a container (in a block). Anyone can verify that
the data has been placed in a container, but only the ‘owner’ of the data
(the one who added the data) can unlock the content of a container by
using private keys.
The chain of keys resides in ledgers that, providing they are widely
distributed (cf. Distributed Ledger Technology - DLT), prevent any
malevolent actor from defrauding or manipulating data. Any person or
company participating in a DLT system has access to their own re-
plicated copy of the ledger, new copies of the ledger are only available
when sufficient numbers of actors within the system agree that the data
in the ledger is correct (consensus). Ledgers are modified and built upon
only by the consensus of all actors in the chain, and any attempt to
manipulate ledgers at any point would be seen, in theory, across all
members of the chain. The consensus mechanism and transparency
underpin trust. The chain can also contain encrypted keys to additional
metadata (e.g., temperature, provenance data, etc.) that sit on or off the
ledger, but which has been collected to further document food safety.
Encrypted keys provide proof of data adulteration: any digital data set
generates a unique key, when tested the same data set will always
generate the same matching key as long as it has not been adulterated.
Adulterated data may provide evidence of adulterated food. In addition,
smart contracts can reside on the ledger, including machine executable
contracts. For example, the ledger could contain reconciliations of how
a batch of food has depleted through manufacturing. This can evidence
non-adulteration, since any batch should deplete to zero during pro-
duction of next stage food items and cannot have a greater mass than
Fig. 1. A schematic diagram demonstrating the flow of data within a food supply chain connected by distributed ledger technology.
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the incoming component mass minus losses and waste.
The immutability of a securely linked blockchain could in theory be
a panacea for food traceability record keeping that could either evi-
dence adulteration at any stage of the production and distribution pi-
peline or accelerate high fidelity tracing and resolution of food safety
issues. Effectively all records required for food traceability are kept as
replicated digital records of linked transactions across whole supply
chains. While it could not prevent malign actors from changing batches
prior to or after data being recorded on the blockchain, or the use of
incorrect data, it would still provide a powerful deterrent to more tra-
ditional fraud mechanisms. The DLT deterrent to food crime is that the
records are in theory immutable and open to all actors, with permis-
sion, to the ledger. All actors within a global supply chain can identify
and report malign actors and immutable records provides a safer basis
for public prosecution or private sanction. DLT therefore helps secure
the evidence chain, it does not replace any of the industry and reg-
ulatory standard procedures (e.g. audit, risk management, food forensic
investigation) required and widely adopted to control fraud and adul-
teration (see Elliott, 2014; Manning and Soon, 2014). It prevents malign
actors from concealing their actions by changing records.
However, the consensus process, whereby actors verify the quality
of each other's data prior to accepting it within a block, develops a
higher degree of supply chain trust. Malevolent actors could be rapidly
exposed and sanctioned in a more open supply chain ecosystem. The
management of sanctions should, in our view, require careful govern-
ance. There is a real risk that innocent parties might be incorrectly
sanctioned by other actors in the supply chain, or disproportionate
penalties might be applied to defaulters. Unsubstantiated allegations
can easily arise in high speed and volume market places, where quality
standards can be subjective. In these instances, clear public and private
governance rules and processes, that include guidance on con-
fidentiality and data ownership, are required; an ultimate sanction
might be to exclude a supplier from the DLT (and therefore their pro-
duct from the food chain), though all entities have a clear legal right to
their own defence.
Blockchain and DLT should accelerate the tracking and tracing of
biologically variable food across complete, even global, supply chains,
thus markedly improving the management of quality issues and serious
breaches in safety (food poisoning, adulteration, contamination). Rapid
and high fidelity tracking and tracing of whole food across supply
chains (beyond one up/one down) will provide the most significant
global impact of DLT; when food safety issues occur, societal impact is
reduced by rapid and co-ordinated action to contain risk. DLT enables
both high speeds backward (to verify provenance of products within a
batch) as well as forward traceability (to verify where a high risk or
faulty product may have been used elsewhere within the supply chain).
Like all traceability systems it is pragmatically limited by process steps
within the food chain (e.g. product mixing to make blends, batch dis-
aggregation), but even with blended or disaggregated products high
speed tracking, plus ready access to metadata, creates time for opera-
tors to isolate and manage risk.
An alternative method to DLT that links global food traceability
would have all actors depositing their information on a single, or few,
regulated ledgers. This ledger could in theory connect supply chain
links in secure blocks (aka blockchain, but with a single ledger).
However, this single trusted party does not exist in the food chain and,
even if it could be envisaged and we do not discount it, it would have to
be as global as the supply chain – this seems highly unlikely to be
achieved in the current market.
4. Permission
It is clear that speed of detection and reaction is critical to the
management of safety issues in the food supply chain. The current “one
up/one down” legislative standard is slow, requiring multiple actors in
unison to track products through their individual safety systems. While
food regulators have the power to compel all actors within a supply
chain to report the provenance and safety assessments of any food as it
flows through the supply chain, such requests for information are only
made in exceptional circumstances and in the interests of public safety.
Private companies do not have the same power as food regulators: their
access to confidential data can only be granted by the consent of all
other actors in the chain, and in a step-by-step backward process down
and across the whole chain. On this basis, only a “permissioned”
blockchain architecture (see Swanson, 2015) such as that enabled in the
Hyperledger fabric (Hyperledger, 2018) or the BigChainDB system
proposed by Tian (2017) could be suitable for complex global food
supply chains, whereby access to data along the chain can only be
granted by permission of the data owners. Private companies are ob-
ligated to keep key data confidential. They could in-advertently breech
anti-competitive trading regulations if they reveal confidential in-
formation of trading activity to and between competitors. It is clear,
therefore, that international standards and guidelines are required to
agree what data is stored on a food blockchain register, the consensus
mechanism, confidentiality and how other people have access to it.
These standards should also define how the data is owned, used and
stored, and by whom, within the chain. For example, it is in the public
interest for regulators to “mine” whole supply chain data for food safety
surveillance and monitoring, but unless food specific “data access
standards” are developed, privacy provisions would in effect limit the
potential of DLT for private companies to little more than what they can
already achieve without blockchain technology. Data access standards
are needed to define what data (e.g. provenance, not price) can be
obtained by - and by consent from - any actors within a supply chain.
Global blockchain standards for all industries are now being developed
by the ISO Blockchain (TC 307) initiative. However, these are not in-
dustry specific and food standards need to be developed as an addition
to this ongoing international process.
5. Could “blockchains” block access to markets?
While blockchains can document and connect complex global
supply chains, the IT infrastructure required to operate and maintain
the system might prevent access to markets for new users or food
suppliers. The systems could, in effect, become a technical barrier to
trade, thus reducing market competition and access (i.e., those that are
not in the chain cannot participate). It would be unacceptable if
“blockchain” effectively blocks and constrains access to the global food
supply chain. This is a tangible issue for any smaller producers in both
developed and developing countries who may wish to export product
into global markets. Conversely resolution of these technical barriers
provides an opportunity for new entrants, since food trust is enhanced.
It is critical that access to blockchain technology be kept simple, low
cost, and easy to implement and deploy. This requires global standards
for data encryption, DLT architectures and access. Agreed standards are
needed to enable the sharing of data across digital platforms and within
supply chains. Developers are clearly aware of this issue and the Linux
Foundation Hyperledger fabric, which uses open source blockchain has
a strong focus on simple API (Application Programming Interface) de-
velopment. However, the creation of international standards is cum-
bersome and requires considerable commitment from all sectors in the
chain.
6. Scalability
Blockchain technology is best known as the system that underpins
BITCOIN and other cryptocurrencies. It is well known that BITCOIN
platform maintenance, in particular mining, requires a huge amount of
computational resource and is estimated to consume up to 43.9MT of
CO2 per annum (Foteinis, 2018), equivalent to that consumed by 6.8M
European citizens. These challenges demonstrate potential scalability
issues in large supply chains. Blockchain applied to the food system will
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not require the mining associated with BITCOIN, but the data scale
could be significant. The global food supply chain is vast, not only in-
volving primary producers (the Food and Agriculture Organisation
FAO) estimates that there are about 570M farmers globally), but also
involving their suppliers, logistics companies, food manufacturers, re-
tailers, restaurants, and consumers. In addition, many food products
comprise multiple ingredients, generate huge amounts of metadata (e.g.
cooking and refrigeration temperatures), and require support from
secondary supply chain providers (e.g. refrigeration companies, audit
and assurance companies, food processing equipment, labelling com-
panies, etc). By crude comparison with global individual data platforms
such as Facebook and similar, we estimate data in the food supply
(block)chain could eventually reach Petabyte scale per year. The data
scale is a function of the number of system users (nodes), since each
node would have its own replicated copy of a ledger that could link
thousands of transactions.
In order to illustrate the data scale, consider each person in the UK
(68m people) completing and recording in DLT the consumption of 5
pieces of food each day. Assume that data is stored in a block restricted
to 1MB of new information (256 bytes per transaction), and that the
chain renews and adds a new block every 10min (aka the Bitcoin block
generation rate). In this case, 85 GB of data will be generated per day
and 31 TB of data will be generated over a year. If we expand the chain
to include 5 prior steps (i.e., farmer, farm logistics, food manufacturer,
logistics and retailer), but assume a compression ratio (as food moves
down the supply chain in large batches and not as individual items) of
1000 per unit of food sold in the retail chain, again with no metadata
attached, the supply chain ledger would generate an additional 155 GB
of data per year.
This theoretically large ledger would need to be refreshed, trans-
mitted or cloud replicated globally to all DLT nodes in the system every
10min (as each block is generated). Clearly, these data calculations are
highly speculative, but do indicate the potential scale challenge in ap-
plying blockchain to the food industry. We see this as a key technical
challenge. Moreover, different architectures are emerging that attempt
to resolve this issue (Tian, 2017; IBM Food Trust) but clearly multiple
standards need to be interoperable otherwise they become a barrier to
trade. This analysis emphasizes the need for more research on opti-
mizing the scalability whilst maintaining interoperability of blockchain
architectures for food. A recent review cited a lack of scalability re-
search as a concern for the whole of blockchain technology per se (Yli-
Huumo et al., 2016). Our analysis emphasizes the need to prepare for
significant data scale.
Given this complexity, it is likely that blockchain solutions will first
emerge in niche, controlled or high-risk areas of the supply chain,
where the technology may have the most significant impact. An ex-
ample of a controlled supply chain might be where a retailer with
significant scale requires suppliers to use a dedicated DLT system for
food traceability. The governance of this controlled chain is led by a
consortium including the retailer, suppliers and IT/DLT provider. It is
quite likely that this approach will create an initial stimulus to use
blockchain in global food chains. Whilst this may provide a competitive
advantage for the controlled chain members, there is a risk/likelihood
that different retailers will adopt different standards resulting in a
number of multiple inoperable DLT silos emerging. This would increase
supplier costs (maintaining multiple ledgers), constrain regulator
ability to operate and potentially become a barrier to trade.
Technical barriers to trade are significant in the context of global
food security. It would be unacceptable to deny farmers, or any supply
chain actor, in both developed and developing countries access to a
supply chain based on the need for specific and perhaps complex digital
infrastructure. Overcoming these challenges, by enabling access to DLT
via low cost hardware (smartphones/tablets) and software independent
of farm size and suitable for all farmers and small holders, is essential.
Pragmatic, low cost and accessible DLT that enhances supply chain trust
and trust worthiness will enable trade. This is because all actors within
a chain can rapidly establish provenance and view linked metadata that
includes accurate records of food origin and quality (e.g. temperature,
quality, audit and product age data). DLT could catalyse and potentially
disrupt global food trade and access. Improved trust and transparency
democratise, widen access, simplify, reduces cost (e.g. need for third
party audits, lower waste, fewer supply chain links etc), increases
supply chain efficiency and protect consumers. In theory consumers can
view the provenance of their food back down a supply chain (so they
self-select product based on experience), whilst farmers could view the
route their product has taken up to the consumer. Self-selection and
repeat purchase by consumers of specific farmers product enabled by
increased transparency rewards producers on the basis of performance.
This transparency increases equity through the supply chain since there
is a clearer and more open understanding of how value is added
through a products life cycle.
It is clear that the food sector will need to rapidly consider how to
adopt DLT across the supply chain. Ultimately application will be a
consequence of a pragmatic approach to data scale balanced against
both risk and trust. If controlled chains (e.g. retailer led) exist with high
levels of trust, for example embedded by long term trading relation-
ships in a highly regulated environment (e.g. abattoirs), then a DLT
structure with relatively low numbers of ledger copies (nodes) and
simple consensus rules would be appropriate. However, in chains with
more limited prior relationships or fewer audit and regulatory controls
then wider ledger distribution (high numbers of nodes), with more
robust consensus arrangements and cryptography might be necessary.
7. For how long do we need to keep the data?
In the EU legislation, there is no set time or legal minimum for how
long food safety, quality and legal records must be kept. Different
countries may even take different approaches. However, it is important
to consider the length of time over which a food might be consumed,
i.e. the durability date (typically a “Use-By” or “Best Before” date), and
also the need to provide information should a related complaint be
raised at any later stage. In the UK for example, best practice laid down
in the Food Industry Guide to Good Hygiene Practice Wholesale
Distribution (Food Standards Agency, 2007), recommends that product
records are kept for a minimum of three years. Even more con-
servatively, many retailers look to keep their records for up to seven
years from sale. At present, there is no obvious economic - or legal -
value in retaining records for periods greater than any likely statutory
period, added to which the cost of doing so may become burdensome to
businesses. However, and in theory, blockchain systems by themselves
can provide immutable and permanent records. The challenge in re-
covering data will then be mainly associated with possible changes in
trading relationships between partners. For example, in a permissioned
ledger, a supplier may not be willing to open their chain to a customer
or the supplier may cease trading with the buyer. Changes in business
relationships may, therefore, break the “permanent” digital chain. To
overcome these issues at regulation level, a system may be required that
provides a “golden key” for regulators to recover information from the
chain regardless of whether the initial permissions are still considered
in effect or not. In addition, it is highly likely that more proprietary
metadata (cooking temperatures, microbiological results, etc.) will be
held off the chain and coded by encrypted keys to show that it has not
been altered. Due to technical obsolescence (e.g. of the support, com-
munication or coding mechanism), it is quite likely that such links will
cease to be available over time, and data standards are, therefore, re-
quired to ensure that data is correctly archived and remains available
for agreed durations post-marketing of any food item.
8. Who would/should/could Own(s) the food blockchain?
The data platform necessary for a food industry blockchain will
require major investment in substantial IT developments and
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infrastructure, which includes API's to encrypt and recover data, ledger
creation and maintenance, storage and communications, etc. Ideally,
the ledgers should automatically generate blocks through the manu-
facturing process and be linked to standard Enterprise Resource
Planning (ERP) systems. The challenge will be to decide who governs
(Kewell et al., 2017) and how to pay for this IT infrastructure. In this
case, there are opportunities for innovative IT systems and business
models to emerge.
9. Final remarks
We believe that DLT in general, and blockchain in particular, can be
used as a technology to assist with food traceability, the ability of DLT
to rapidly trace food beyond one up/one down is critical and novel but
it is not a stand-alone panacea. Despite its benefits there are still several
open challenges that need to be addressed before DLT can be used to
support food traceability. Examples of these open challenges are con-
cerned with the need of data standardization in the food domain, ease
of use to remove barriers to entry to the food supply chain, governance
mechanisms, enhancement of the technology to cope with a large
amount of data (scalability), privacy mechanisms to protect users and
an iterative approach is required to underpin the adoption of the
technology across the whole chain. Our expectation is that blockchain
implementation will be primarily driven to improve speed and fidelity
of traceability to protect brands (private action) and the public (reg-
ulator action) from food safety issues.
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